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1DEAD MEN TELLING TALES – A POLICY-BASED PROPOSAL FOR 
SURVIVABILITY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS UNDER THE CIVIL FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT
Vickie J. Williams1
“You are well on your way to becoming a pirate already . . . you are obsessed with 
treasure.”
Captain Jack Sparrow (Johnny Depp) to William Turner 
(Orlando Bloom) in PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN, THE CURSE 
OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney 2003).
“Yes I am a pirate, two hundred years too late.  The cannons don’t thunder, there’s 
nothing to plunder, I’m an over-forty victim of fate.”
Jimmy Buffett, A Pirate Looks at Forty, on SONGS YOU KNOW 
BY HEART (MCA  Records 1990).
I.  INTRODUCTION
Despite the demise of job security for pirates during the modern age lamented by 
singer/songwriter Jimmy Buffett in “A Pirate Looks at Forty,” the box-office success of 
recent movies about pirates such as Walt Disney Studio’s “Pirates of the Caribbean—The 
Curse of the Black Pearl” evidences the continued appeal of treasure-hunting and 
swashbuckling in the modern world. Therefore, it should be no surprise that a statute 
passed by Congress almost 140 years ago, designed to encourage private citizens to dig 
deeply into the affairs of entities that contract with the federal government in search of 
wrongdoing and extract buried treasure, continues to appeal to the watchdogs of the 
public fisc.  More than a century after its birth as a fraud-fighting tool during wartime, the 
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2civil False Claims Act2 [hereinafter, “the Act”] continues to pique the imagination and 
fuel dreams of bounty and glory for both publicly anointed fraud -fighters and private 
persons who are authorized to sue on behalf of themselves and the Government under the 
Act’s unique “qui tam”3 provisions.4 Consider the following modern-day uses of the Act,
which illustrate its continued appeal to private citizens:
In order to be reimbursed for their costs in caring for Medicare patients, 
hospitals prepare a “cost report” and submit it to the federal government.  
A Chief Financial Officer of a hospital in Whitefish, Montana refused to 
prepare an “aggressive” cost report for submission to Medicare and an 
inconsistent “reserve” cost report for submission to the hospital’s auditors.  
The “aggressive” cost report showed greater costs to the hospital for 
caring for Medicare patients than the “reserve” cost report showed.  The 
CFO was terminated from his position.  In the course of pursuing a 
wrongful termination action against the hospital’s management company, 
which was a national company, the CFO discovered that all of the 
hospitals managed by the company submitted “aggressive” cost reports to 
Medicare that he considered fraudulent.  The CFO filed a qui tam action 
under the Act against the management company, resulting in a total 
settlement payment of $85,773,745.81 by the company and a recovery of 
$20,585,698.99 by the CFO;5
A sales representative for a cardiovascular device manufacturer filed a qui
tam suit under the Act against 132 teaching hospitals.  He alleged that they 
had defrauded federal health care programs by submitting claims and 
receiving payments for services provided to patients participating in 
clinical trials involving cardiac devices that had not been fully approved 
for marketing by the Food and Drug Administration, in violation of a 
provision of a 1986 Medicare Manual that stated that payment would not 
be made for such procedures.  The case, filed in 1994, continues ten years 
later against forty hospitals. The government and the sales representative
2
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3have collected millions of dollars from teaching hospitals that have settled
the cases against them;6
A disgruntled doctoral student brought a qui tam action under the Act 
against his former faculty advisor, alleging that the faculty advisor 
collaborated with other researchers to publish scholarly articles based on 
fabricated research and used the publications to defraud the Veterans 
Administration.  The complaint was ultimately dismissed, but not before 
the defendant incurred significant costs by being forced to defend the 
matter on the student’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.7
Recoveries under the Act are potentially enormous because the Act authorizes the 
imposition of treble damages and substantial per-claim penalties against its violators.8
The magnitude of potential recovery provides federal prosecutors with a strong incentive 
to use the Act. Nevertheless, this powerful weapon does not work only for the federal 
government.  The Act’s “qui tam” or whistleblower provision allows a private party to 
sue on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the United States, and collect a substantial 
bounty if the suit is successful.9  Actions brought by whistleblowers under the Act have 
recovered a total of $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 alone.10
The similarity between whistle blowing under the Act and the pursuit of bounty 
on the high seas did not go unnoticed even by the first courts to construe the statute, well 
over one hundred years ago.  Early in the history of the Act, one court described the qui 
tam provisions of the Act as follows:  “Prosecutions conducted by such means [through a 
private whistleblower] compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer 
6 In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litigation, 221 F.R.D. 318 (D. Conn. 2004); Warren King, UW Agrees To 
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4does to the slow-going public vessel.”11 The potential windfall encourages private parties
to attempt to use this fraud-fighting weapon for their own financial benefit, even when 
the United States has determined that it has no interest in pursuing a particular case.12
Just as the potential rewards to the successful whistleblower are never far from 
the minds of potential qui tam relators13 under the Act, the specter of financial ruin and 
adverse publicity that inevitably follows a prosecution under the Act is never far from the 
mind of entities that contract with the federal government.14 The magnitude of the 
damages recoverable under the Act, the collateral consequences of being found liable 
under the Act,15 and the inevitable tension between the United States, the relator, and the 
defendant when a treasure-hunting relator independently pursues a case that the United 
States has declined to pursue, gives rise to unique legal issues and challenges.  In addition 
to substantive legal complications, many procedural complications spring from the 
complex relationship between the relator and the Government, and the unique procedural 
requirements for bringing a qui tam action under the Act.16
Not least among these complications is the length of time that a qui tam case 
under the Act can be under development, or filed and pending in court, before the 
defendant even knows of the action’s existence.  The statute of limitations for bringing a 
11 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885), aff’d, 30 F. 762 (1887).
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5case under the Act can be as long as ten years.17 Even once a case is filed in court, the 
United States can request to keep it under seal for long periods of time, in renewable 
increments, at the discretion of the court.18  Additionally, along with a civil prosecution
initiated under the Act, the United States often initiates a parallel criminal proceeding
based on the same conduct, warranting a stay of the Act’s civil proceedings.19 It is also 
not uncommon for the defendant to declare bankruptcy while proceedings under the Act 
are pending, triggering an automatic stay of the proceedings in accordance with federal 
bankruptcy law.20
Given the uncommonly long time periods that a qui tam relator’s cause of action 
under the Act can remain in limbo, both prior to filing and after it is filed in court, the
prospect of a relator’s death during the pendency of the action is very real.21  When the 
relator dies while the case remains pending, and the United States has declined to 
intervene in the case, the court must decide whether the action survives the relator’s 
death.  The United States Supreme Court has issued conflicting guidance about the 
17
 A civil action under the Act must be brought within six years from the date of the violation, or three 
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6“punitive”22 or “remedial”23 nature of the Act; the distinction that is the basis for the 
historical test for survivability or abatement of a federal statutory cause of action.  
Therefore, lower courts faced with this question have reached conflicting conclusions.24
Part II of this article discusses the current version of the Act and its evolution 
from its original 1863 version.  Part III discusses the historical common-law test for 
determining whether an action based on a federal statute survives or abates upon the 
plaintiff’s death.  It then discusses the special problems of applying this test to the Act, 
caused by the dual remedial and penal nature of the Act, and the complex relationship 
between the qui tam relator and the Government as plaintiffs in cases brought under the 
Act. Part IV discusses the unique provisions of the Act that limit the courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction in certain cases, and the effect those provisions have on the 
survivability analysis.  Part V proposes adopting a simpler, policy-based test for 
survivability of a qui tam action under the Act, and explains why under this test such 
cases should survive the death of a relator, except in the rare case where the court cannot 
establish its subject matter jurisdiction, or the defendant is so severely prejudiced by the 
absence of the relator that principles of federal civil procedure require that the case be 
dismissed.
II. THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND ITS QUI TAM PROVISIONS
A. The Current Version of the Civil False Claims Act
The current version of the civil False Claims Act [hereinafter, “the Act”] makes 
liable any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent 
22 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784-785 (2000).
23 Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130-131 (2003).
24 See Harrington, 209 F. Supp.2d 1085 (holding that the qui tam relator’s cause of action abates upon his 
death); contra United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC, 11 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the qui tam
relator’s cause of action survives his death).
7claim to the United States for payment or approval.25  The Act also imposes liability for 
making false records or statements designed to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation 
to pay or transmit money or property to the United States.26  The “knowledge” required 
for violation of the Act includes actual knowledge of the false information, deliberate 
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information, and reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the information.27  No specific intent to defraud is required.28  A person found 
liable under the Act is subject to treble damages and penalties of up to $10,000 per 
claim.29
A private person (the qui tam relator) may bring a civil action for violation of the 
Act, for the person and for the United States [hereinafter, the “Government”].30 The 
relator must serve the complaint and a “written disclosure of substantially all material 
evidence and information the person possesses” on the Government.31  The complaint
must be filed in camera, under seal, and remains under seal for at least 60 days, subject to 
the Government’s motions to extend the seal for good cause shown.32 While the case 
remains under seal, the Government is supposed to investigate the claims and the 
evidence revealed in the disclosure statement, and determine whether it wants to 
intervene in the action and prosecute the defendant under its own name.33  If the 
Government declines to intervene, the relator may pursue the case without the 
25
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8Government.34  If the relator proceeds alone, the relator is entitled to receive between 
twenty-five and thirty percent of the proceeds or settlement of the action.35  If the 
Government intervenes, the relator’s share is between fifteen and twenty-five percent of 
the proceeds or settlement.36
B. The Evolution of the Act 
The original False Claims Act was enacted in 1863, in response to alleged fraud 
and waste in government contracts between the Union army and unscrupulous private 
contractors during the Civil War.37  It contained a qui tam provision from its inception.38
Qui tam statutes were imported from England, where Blackstone characterized them as 
penal statutes, designed to redress wrongs to the public.39  Because the qui tam relator 
sues on behalf of the Government, the relator can be looked upon as an advocate of the 
public interest, taking the place of public officials who would otherwise advocate the 
public interest.40 At the time of the original Act, the United States Attorney General had 
little assistance in carrying out his responsibilities, and the qui tam action was a popular 
means of counteracting the lack of an effective public police force for investigating and 
dealing with public wrongs.41  At the time of enactment, the False Claims Act authorized 
34
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9remedies of double damages, penalties of $2,000 per false claim, and criminal 
sanctions.42
Despite the potential for large monetary awards against violators of the statute, 
early case law characterized the Act as remedial, but designed to protect the public 
interest.  In United States v. Griswold,43 the trial court stated:  “The statute is a remedial 
one.  It is intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that 
encompasses it on every side, and should be construed accordingly.”44
 During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Government’s reach into the economic life 
of the nation grew longer.45  More financial dealings between the Government and 
private business created more opportunities for fraud and whistle blowing.  Enterprising 
qui tam relators began to use information in publicly available criminal indictments to 
initiate civil cases under the Act.46  In the landmark case of United States ex rel. Marcus 
v. Hess,47 the qui tam relator merely copied a publicly available criminal indictment into 
a civil complaint and filed it under the then-current version of the Act.48 His complaint 
requested half of the Government’s proceeds from a civil judgment based on the 
complaint, although the relator brought no new information to the Government.49  The 
Government argued for dismissal, on the grounds that such cases served no public 
purpose, as they added nothing to the Government’s preexisting knowledge of a 
42
 Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §3729 et. seq. (2000) 
(civil), and Title 18 Sections 286, 287, 1001, and 1002 of the United States Code (criminal)).
43
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44 Id. at 366.   Despite the apparent perception of the judiciary that the federal treasury was being attacked 
on all sides, very few cases were brought under the 1863 version of the Act.  See 1 BOESE, supra note 4, 
§1.01[B].
45
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46Id.
47
 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
48 Id.
49 Id.
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particular fraud, and served only to require the Government to share any recovery of 
fraudulent gains with a relator who had added no value to the case.50 The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, based on the text of the Act, which did not limit 
rewards to relators who provided new information to the government.51
  The Marcus decision prompted the Attorney General of the United States to 
request repeal of the qui tam provisions of the Act.52  Repeal legislation passed the House 
of Representatives, but the provisions were reinstituted by the Senate.53  Rather than 
repeal the qui tam provisions all together, to address the seeming ability of relators to 
enrich themselves under the Act with no concomitant benefit to the public, Congress 
amended the Act in 1943 to absolutely bar the federal courts from having jurisdiction 
over qui tam suits based on allegations known to the government before the suit was 
filed.54  This jurisdictional bar remained in place even if the relator was the original 
source of the government’s information.55
Although the 1943 amendments may have had the desired effect of emphasizing 
the remedial nature of the Act, the courts interpreted them in such a way as to have the 
undesired effect of chilling relators’ use of the statute to assist the United States in 
detecting fraud and waste in government contracting.56  In 1986, in response to Congress’ 
perception that “[F]raud permeates generally all Government programs ranging from 
welfare and food stamp benefits, to multibillion dollar defense procurements, to crop 
50 Id.
51 Id. at 546.
52
 S. Rep. 99-345 at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5276.
53 Id.
54
 31 U.S.C. §232-235 (1976) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§3729-3733).
55
 1 BOESE, supra  note 4, §1.02.  The original Senate amendments allowed a relator who was the original 
source of the Government’s information to proceed even if the information was already in the possession of 
the Government, but the resulting conference report dropped this clause.  S. Rep. 99-345 at 12 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277.
56 See S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269.
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subsidies and disaster relief programs,”57 Congress amended the Act, intending to make it 
easier and more attractive for relators to bring private suits under the Act.58  The most 
notable changes were:  (1) A clarification that specific intent to defraud was not required 
to establish a violation of the Act, and that acting in deliberate ignorance of the fraud or 
with reckless disregard for the truth of the information in a claim provided to the 
Government was sufficient to violate the Act;59 (2) clarifying that the burden of proof for 
a violation of the Act was the standard burden for civil cases, i.e., a “preponderance of 
the evidence;”60 (3) lengthening the statute of limitations in certain cases;61 (4) changing 
the remedy for violating the Act from double to treble damages and significantly 
increasing the money penalties available under the Act;62 and (5) expanding the rights of 
qui tam relators and increasing their financial incentives to bring suit under the Act.63
Despite these changes to the Act, all of which increased the harshness of the 
potential remedy for violating the Act, and many of which enhanced the ability and 
incentives for private persons to benefit from bringing violations of the Act to the 
Government’s attention, Congress repeatedly emphasized the public yet remedial purpose 
of the Act when explaining the amendments.64  Nowhere does Congress state that it 
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id. at 4-6.
59 Id. at 7; contra United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972).
60
 S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 30-31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5295-96; contra United
States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962).
61
 S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5280.
62
 31 U.S.C. §3729(a) (2000).  Despite the seemingly large increase in money penalties made by the 1986 
Amendments to the Act (from $2,000 to a $10,000 maximum), according to the Congressional Research 
Service, the buying power of $2,000 in 1863 was actually close to $18,000 in 1986.  H. R. 99-660 at 17 
(1986).  Thus, this was not really an increase as much as a cost of living adjustment, and an imcomplete 
one at that.
63 See 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(1) (2000); S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 23-24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5288-89.
64 See, e.g., S. Rep. 99-562 at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266 (stating the False 
Claims Reform Act’s purpose “is to enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses sustained as a 
12
intended to redress individual wrongs via the Act’s qui tam enforcement scheme.65  The 
public interest purpose of qui tam actions under the amended Act has been recognized by 
a majority of courts that have interpreted the amended Act.66
Nevertheless, since enactment of the 1986 Amendments, not every court has 
agreed that the Act serves only a public purpose.  In United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC 
Corp.,67   the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited the fact that a qui tam relator may 
suffer substantial emotional and financial harm due to his unwitting involvement in fraud, 
or due to his status as a relator.68 Citing these examples of possible individual harms 
suffered by a relator, the Neher court held that the FCA’s qui tam provisions are intended 
to redress wrongs suffered by individual relators, and not the general public.69  The Neher
court went on to hold that because the qui tam provisions of the Act are designed to 
redress individual wrongs suffered by relators, they are remedial as to the relator, and 
survive the relator’s death.70  The Neher court used the historical common-law test for 
survivability of a federal statutory cause of action to reach this result.71
result of fraud against the Government.”); id at 6. (describing the Act as “a civil remedy designed to make 
the Government whole for fraud losses”).
65
 The 1986 amendments created a new cause of action against an employer who retaliates against an 
employee because the employee aided in a prosecution under the Act.  31 U.S.C. §3730(h) (2000).  This 
cause of action contemplates that a successful employee-plaintiff has suffered an individual wrong, because 
the employee is entitled to “all relief necessary to make the employee whole” as a remedy, including 
reinstatement, two times the amount of back pay owed plus interest, and compensation for special damages.  
Id.  The double back pay damages of Section 3730(h) have been held to be remedial, rather than punitive.  
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Satalich v. City of Los Angeles, 160 F. Supp.2d 1092, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 
2001); Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 198 F. Supp.2d 1080, 1087-88 (E.D. Mo. 2001).  This 
supports interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of the Act as redressing an individual wrong.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir. 1995).
67
 11 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1994).
68 Id. at 138.
69 Id.  The Neher court appeared to be construing the pre-1986 version of the Act, which the United States 
had characterized as “remedial” in United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976).  The pre-1986 
version of the Act also did not contain a specific remedy for employee-whistleblowers who experience 
retaliation as a result of their whistleblowing activities.  See 31 U.S.C. §3730(h) (2000).
70 Neher, 11 F.3d at 138.  The Neher court did not consider the possibility that the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the Act, rather than the qui tam provisions, were designed to redress individual wrongs.
71 Id. at 136-137.
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III. SURVIVABILITY OF A QUI TAM CASE UNDER THE ACT
IV.
A. The Historical Federal Common-Law Test
The survivability of a cause of action created by federal statute is determined by 
federal common law, unless there is an expression of contrary intent in the statute itself.72
There is no expression of contrary intent in the Act.73 Therefore, if we use the historical
test, we must look to federal common law to determine whether a cause of action under 
the Act survives the relator’s death.
Under the historical federal common-law test for survivability, actions that are
“penal” abate upon the death of a plaintiff, while “remedial” actions survive.74 At
common law, a statute giving a private right of action against a wrongdoer was truly
“penal” only when it imposed punishment for an offense committed against the sovereign
or the state.75  Statutes that created a private right of action against a wrongdoer for a 
party who was not injured by the wrongdoer (such as a qui tam relator) were 
characterized as “penal” in some ways, but not “strictly” penal in the traditional sense. 76
As the United States Supreme Court explained:
The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover 
damages caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to be 
‘penal against the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer.’ Hyde
v. Cogan 2 Doug. 699, 705, 706.  A statute giving the right to recover back 
money lost at gaming and, if the loser does not sue within a certain time, 
authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other person for 
threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though 
penal as regards the suit by a common informer.77
72 Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, et al., 6 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925).
73
 Neher, 11 F.3d at 137; United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Providence in Oregon, 209 F. 
Supp.2d 1085, 1086 (D. Or. 2002).
74 Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1883). 
75 Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667-668 (1892); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
76 Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667-668.
77 Id. at 667; see also Schreiber, 110 U.S.at 79 (characterizing as punitive a suit for statutory penalties and 
forfeitures for copyright infringement, where the deceased plaintiff had not sustained any damage due to 
the alleged copyright infringement).
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Statutes that provided for recovery to a party who was injured by the defendant’s 
conduct were considered “remedial,” and thus survived the death of the plaintiff, while 
statutes that provided for recovery to an uninjured party, even if not the public, were 
considered “penal” in some sense.78  With regard to common-law claims that were not 
based on statutes, suits based on claims that were considered “personal” to the plaintiff, 
such as tort actions for personal injuries, abated upon the death of the plaintiff, while 
suits based on property or contract rights survived the plaintiff.79
The difficulty with applying this approach to determining the survivability of a 
qui tam action under the Act arises from the complex nature of the statute itself, in 
addition to the complex relationship between the relator and the Government.  The statute 
is designed to compensate the public (the Government) for losses sustained as a victim of 
fraud, and thus, fits the historical definition of a “penal” statute.80 Nevertheless, the 
statute is remedial in that it authorizes recovery to an injured party.81  The difficulty 
arises from the fact that the injured party is the public, against whom remedies for 
offenses were traditionally considered punitive, and therefore, not survivable.  The Act 
codifies a remedy for the common-law tort of fraud, which was traditionally a “personal” 
claim of a plaintiff that does not survive death.82  Nevertheless, when the plaintiff is a qui 
tam relator, the injury asserted is the injury of the Government, a party that does not die
with the relator.83  Even where the Government has declined to intervene in the case, it
78 Huntington, 145 U.S. at 667.
79 Almour v. Pace, 193 F.2d 699, 700 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
80
 S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266.
81 Id.
82
 Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1883).
83 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000).
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remains a party, with the right to have all pleadings and depositions transcripts served on 
it by request, and it may intervene at a later date “upon a showing of good cause.”84
1. The Dual “Remedial” and “Penal” Nature of the Act
The dual remedial and penal nature of the Act is best illustrated by a series of 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions on who can be a defendant under the Act. 
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,85 the United 
States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether states were “persons” who could be 
sued under the Act.86  In holding that as a matter of statutory construction, states were not 
persons who could be sued under the Act, the Court described the Act as “a federal law 
designed to benefit ‘the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any individual 
State that might violate the [statute]’.”87   Despite the fact that this purpose is consistent 
with a finding that the Act is remedial with regard to the Government, the Court’s 
opinion in Stevens muddied the waters regarding the punitive versus remedial nature of 
the Act with regard to relators.  As part of its holding, the Stevens Court, without any 
historical analysis or the application of any test for distinguishing “punitive” civil actions 
from “remedial” civil actions, characterized the treble damages and civil penalty 
provisions of the Act as “punitive.”88   The Court did not distinguish between the 
“punitive” purposes of the Act’s remedies as applied by a qui tam relator versus their 
84
 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(4) (2000).  Out of 3,954 qui tam cases filed through September 30, 2002, the 
Government had intervened in only 718 cases as of December 16, 2002.  2 BOESE, supra note 4, Appendix 
H-1.   These statistics indicate that it is uncommon for the Government to intervene, either at the inception 
of the case or later for “good cause.” 
85
 529 U.S. at 786. 
86 Id. at n.15.
87 Id., quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); see also Cook County, Illinois v. 
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133 (2003), quoting  S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 2 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 (stating that the basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make 
the Act a “more useful tool” to combat fraud against the Government) (emphasis added).
88 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 784-785.  The Court used the punitive characterization of damages under the Act to 
bolster its argument that Congress did not intend to include the states, which are immune from punitive 
damages at common law, in the definition of “persons” who could be liable under the Act.  Id. 
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“remedial” purposes as applied by the United States, although long-standing precedent
permitted the Court to make such a distinction.89
After Stevens, lower federal courts were left with little guidance on how to 
characterize the Act for purposes of applying it to cases where the defendant was 
traditionally immune from punitive damages, and the Government had declined to 
intervene in the case.  It is not surprising that lower courts came to conflicting 
conclusions regarding the applicability of the Act to municipalities, that engage in a great 
deal of contracting with the Government, yet are traditionally immune from punitive 
damages.90 It is also not surprising that a federal court faced with the specific question of 
survivability of a relator’s action struggled to answer the question consistent with 
Vermont Agency and the historical common-law test.  In United States ex rel. Harrington 
v. Sisters of Providence in Oregon,91 the only reported case since Stevens to decide the 
question of whether a cause of action brought by a qui tam relator under the Act survives 
the relator’s death, the court attempted to apply the traditional common-law test of 
“remedial” versus “punitive” to the question.  Trying to reconcile legislative history 
indicating that the Act was primarily meant to be remedial with Vermont Agency’s 
characterization of the current version of the Act as “punitive,” the Harrington court held 
that even if the Act could still be considered remedial after Vermont Agency, because 
Harrington had not alleged personal or substantial individual harm, the claim was not 
89 See, e.g., Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668-669 (1892).
90 Compare United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, 277 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2002), aff’d sub nom. 
Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, (2003) (holding that municipalities, 
which are presumed to be immune from punitive damage actions, could be sued under the Act), with United 
States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 279 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2002) and United States ex rel. 
Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 244 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that municipalities cannot be 
sued under the Act because the Act imposes punitive damages).
91209 F.Supp.2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002).
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remedial as to him, and did not survive his death.92 The Harrington court did not 
consider the effect of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Vermont Agency that 
the injured party was the Government, which survives the relator’s death.93
Shortly thereafter, in Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler94 the 
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify its statements regarding the punitive 
versus remedial nature of the treble damages provisions of the Act, at least for purposes 
of applying the Act to municipalities that are immune from punitive damages at common 
law.  The Chandler Court characterized the Act’s treble damages as having a 
“compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives.”95  The 
Court specifically acknowledged the role the presence of a qui tam relator plays in 
characterizing the Act’s damages as “compensatory,” retreating from its prior statement 
in Vermont Agency that treble damages under the Act were “punitive.” 96 The Court re-
emphasized that the purpose of the statute was public, to compensate the Government, 
rather than to redress a qui tam relator’s individual wrong.97
2. The Modern Formulation of the Historical Test of Survivability
In Murphy v. Household Finance Corp.,98 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit articulated a test that is widely use for characterizing a federal statutory 
cause of action as “penal” or “remedial.”99 The Murphy test was created from earlier 
92 Id. at 1088-1089.
93 Id.
94
 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
95 Id. at 130; see also, United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter, Mackby I] 
(holding that the Act’s treble damages provision, in combination with the Act’s statutory penalties, is not 
“solely” remedial).
96 Chandler, 538 U.S. at 131.
97 Id.
98
 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
99
 The United States Supreme Court did not cite to the Murphy test in either Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, or 
Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, when discussing the penal and remedial nature of the Act.  Nevertheless, in United 
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judicial pronouncements of the factors a court should consider in determining the penal 
versus remedial nature of a federal statute.100 Under the Murphy test, a court looks at:  
(1) Whether the purpose of the statute is to redress individual wrongs or more general 
wrongs to the public;101 (2) whether recovery under the statute runs to the harmed 
individual, or to the public;102 and (3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is 
wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered.103 Although this test has not explicitly been 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, its elements are rooted in long-standing 
precedents discussing what a court should consider when determining the “penal” or 
“remedial” nature of a statute.104 Although the Murphy test has both a historical pedigree 
and a degree of flexibility, because of the dual nature of the Act and the differing 
interests and rights of the two parties deemed to be plaintiffs in a qui tam case, analyzing 
the Act under each of the test’s prongs does not yield a satisfactory answer to the 
question of whether a qui tam case survives the death of the relator.
a. The Purpose of the Act
As illustrated in Section II (B), supra, the text and the legislative history of the 
1986 Amendments do little to clear up the confusion regarding the punitive versus 
remedial nature of the Act.105  Historically, breaches of public rights and duties, which 
States ex rel. Neher v. NEC, 11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1994), the court used the Murphy test to determine 
survivability of a qui tam case under the Act.
100 See Murphy, 560 F.2d at 208-209, quoting Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), and earlier cases 
cited therein at length.
101 Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668; Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161.
102 Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; Read v. Stewart, 129 Mass. 407, 410 (1880).
103 Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209; see also, Stevenson v. Stoufer, 21 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 1946) (recovery of 
$1750 based on overcharges totaling $26.25 under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 indicated that 
the cause of action created by the statute was penal, rather than remedial).
104 See, e.g, Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668; Read, 129  Mass. at 410 (1880).
105
 This confusion regarding the punitive or remedial nature of statutory treble damages provisions is not 
unique to the Act.  It also appears in construction of the federal antitrust laws and their treble damages 
provisions.  See 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade §393 (2004); Cinnamon v. Abner A.
Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833, 837 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
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affect the whole community, are “distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and 
misdemeanors,” and sanctions for such breaches are considered punitive.106  Given that
the historical purpose of the Act, including its qui tam provisions, was to redress and 
deter general wrongs to the public, and the strong legislative history indicating that the 
1986 Amendments to the Act have, first and foremost, the purpose of redressing general 
wrongs to the public, one could argue that the Act should be considered punitive, despite 
the continual insistence of Congress that its purpose is remedial.  The traditional 
“punitive” versus “remedial” distinction simply does not fit a federal statute designed to 
redress financial losses to the Government, as well as to deter violations of public rights 
and duties.  It does not provide guidance for a court to determine whether such a statute
can or should be considered to redress an “individual” harm, albeit a harm to the 
Government, such that a cause of action brought under the statute should survive the 
relator, who has not suffered personal harm.  
b. The Relationship Between the Relator and the Government and the 
Concept of a “Harmed Individual.”
The relationship between the relator and the United States has been described as 
one of “mandated cooperation.”107  The Act contemplates the relator working with the 
Government, but the Government exercising significant control over the case.108 When 
the United States intervenes in the action, it has the power to dismiss the action over the 
objections of the relator,109 settle the action over the objections of the relator,110 and 
106
 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
107
 Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 939, 949 (2002).
108 Id.
109
 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(2)(A) (2000).
110
 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(2)(B) (2000).
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restrict the participation of the relator in the action.111 Even when the United States 
declines to intervene in the case, the United States may move to dismiss the relator’s 
case, if it believes that pursuing the case is not in the Government’s best interests.112  This 
intricate and unique relationship between the relator and the Government, where the two 
parties who are supposedly aligned in interest disagree about the merits of and/or the 
methodology for pursuing the case, is one of the factors that makes application of the 
historical test for survivability of a federal statutory cause of action unworkable with 
regard to qui tam actions brought under the Act.
A relator sues on behalf of the United States as well as himself.113 In Stevens,114
the United States Supreme Court unequivocally stated that this language means that the 
relator is not merely a mechanism of enforcement, as had been suggested by some lower 
federal courts.115  For the first time, the Court stated that a qui tam relator is a partial 
assignee of the United States’ injury in fact, with standing to assert a claim on his own 
111
 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(2)(C) (2000).
112 See Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 251-252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 944 (2003); United
States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing Co., 151 F. 3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998);  Juliano  v.
Federal Asset Disposition Ass’n., 736 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  Although cooperation between the relator and the Government is likely and expected when the 
United States intervenes in the action and prosecutes the case, this cooperative atmosphere often evaporates 
when the United States declines to intervene, or when the interests of the United States and the interests of 
the relator do not coincide.  Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 n.5 
(1997). Case law is replete with references to conflicts between the relator and the United States when the 
United States has declined to intervene in a case under the Act, and the relator has taken action of which the 
United States does not approve. See, e.g., Schimmels and United States v.  Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875 (9th
Cir. 1997) (United States attempts to escape the outcome of the relator’s adversary proceeding in 
bankruptcy against a defendant under the Act after it declined to intervene in the relator’s proceeding);  
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrup, 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994) (United States objects to 
settlement of case brought by relator under the Act, alleging collusion between the relator and the 
defendant to deprive the United States of its fair share of the settlement).   Likewise, relators often claim 
that the United States does not represent their interests in conjunction with cases brought under the Act.   
See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997) (relator alleges that his interests 
are not adequately represented by the United States in an action collateral to a claim brought by the relator 
under the Act, because the United States had not yet decided whether to intervene in the relator’s action).
113 See Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 877 n.1(emphasis added).
114
 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
115 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
ex rel. Semtner v. Medical Consultants, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 490, 494 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
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behalf, not merely as a tool of the Government.116  Although the Court’s characterization 
of the relator as a partial assignee assures the relator’s status as something more than a 
mechanism of enforcement, in so holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea 
that a qui tam relator alleges a personal injury sufficient to confer constitutional standing 
to bring a claim under the Act.117  According to the Court, the qui tam relator has no 
personal injury even if alleging having suffered personal harm or difficulty as a result of 
the defendant’s actions.118  The Court thereby rejected a concept that was embraced by 
some lower courts to explain why the relator had constitutional standing to bring suit.119
The characterization of the relationship between the qui tam relator and the 
United States also affects the characterization of the recovery that the qui tam relator 
receives.  As the Vermont Agency Court stated, if the relator is merely a statutorily 
designated agent of the United States, “the relator’s bounty is simply the fee he receives 
out of the United States’ recovery for filing and/or prosecuting a successful action on 
behalf of the Government.”120  If this was the case, and the relator’s standing to sue in a 
qui tam case brought under the Act is merely as an agent of the United States, the bounty 
a successful relator received under the Act should have the same character as the United 
States’ recovery.  If treble damages and penalties of up to $11,000 per claim under the 
116Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.
117 Id.  Because a qui tam relator represents the Government’s interests, several courts have held that a qui 
tam relator cannot pursue a qui tam action pro se.  See United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 775 
(7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951).  This holding appears to ignore the United 
States Supreme Court’s recognition in Stevens that the according to the Act, the relator sues on behalf of 
himself as well as the government.  See n.102, supra.  Indeed, the Lu court did not even mention Stevens in 
its opinion.  Perhaps Judge Posner was influenced to dismiss the case outright without examining the 
soundness of holding that a pro se relator cannot bring a case in light of Stevens by the fact that he thought 
the complaint was “incoherent, even crazy.”  Lu, 368 F.3d at 776.
118 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773-774.
119 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 739 (3d Cir. 1997); 
United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing, 9 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC
Corp., 11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Providence in
Oregon, 209 F. Supp.2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002).
120 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772 (emphasis in original).
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Act are punitive when there is no qui tam relator, then they should be punitive when 
collected through the actions of the qui tam relator as an agent.  If they are remedial, then 
they should be remedial whether collected via a qui tam relator agent or by the United 
States acting alone.
As the Stevens Court recognized, characterizing the qui tam relator as an agent of 
the United States reads the Act’s language authorizing a person to bring a civil action 
under the Act “for the person” as well as for the United States Government out of the 
Act, and therefore the Act.121 Therefore, the Act should not be so construed. 122  By 
characterizing the qui tam relator as a “partial assignee” of the United States, the Court 
remained true to the text of the statute, and avoided reading this provision out of the 
statute, in accordance with the tenets of statutory construction.
Nevertheless, the Court’s characterization of the relator as a “partial assignee” 
makes application of the second prong of the Murphy formulation of the common-law 
test to determine survivability of a qui tam action under the Act unworkable.  An assignee 
typically stands in the shoes of the assignor with respect to both the injury and the 
remedy.123  But the typical assignee has paid some consideration to the assignor for the 
assignment,124 which is not the case for qui tam relators.  Furthermore, it is well-
established that a “claim” cannot simply refer to the right to bring suit.125  Congress 
121 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772.
122 See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ 
that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or 
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”) quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
123 Connecticut v. Physicians Health Services of Connecticut, Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2002).
124 Id.
125 Id.
23
cannot grant standing to party based on only a public interest in the proper administration 
of the laws.126
Therefore, it remains unclear what part of the United States’ claim under the Act 
is assigned to the relator.  It cannot be only the right to sue.  The partial assignment of the 
United States’ “claim” to the relator may include an assignment of part of the United 
States’ actual injury. The Government may be considered a “harmed individual,” and the 
relator therefore be considered to have assigned status as a “harmed individual.”127  But 
because only the United States is injured in a cause of action brought under the Act, 
although recovery under the statute runs to both the qui tam relator and the Government, 
it may be that there is no “harmed individual,” and the statute is punitive with regard to 
both the relator and the Government.128
Historically, if a cause of action was assignable, then it was also considered to be 
survivable.129  The Court’s characterization of the Act as providing a right that is at least 
partially assignable supports a finding that the Act survives the death of a party under the 
long-accepted common-law rule,130 but contradicts the Court’s insistence that the qui tam
relator has no personal injury for purposes of constitutional standing. The Court may not 
have realized that its characterization of the qui tam relator as a partial assignee for 
purposes of standing in Stevens could have implications for determining the survivability 
126 Id.
127 Murphy v. Household Finance Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
128 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770.
129 Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corporation, 37 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Okla. 1941) 
(“Assignability and survivability are convertible terms”); Imperial Film Exchange v. General Film Co., 244 
F. 985, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (“By a long list of decisions the general test of survivability of actions is their 
assignability.”).
130
 The common law rule has its genesis in English law.  The common law rule that actions in tort do not 
survive the death of the injured party was first modified by the Statute of 4 Edward the III, c. 7, to allow an 
action for trespass to goods and chattels to survive the death of a plaintiff.  See Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 
571, 573 (7th Cir. 1935).
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of a cause of action under the Act.   Nevertheless, shortly after the Stevens decision, the 
Court had an opportunity to undo some of the mischief it had wrought by characterizing 
the Act’s treble damages as penal. In Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. 
Chandler,131 the Court unanimously determined that municipalities, which are presumed 
to be immune from punitive damages, were subject to suit under the Act.132  The Court 
described the Act’s treble damages provision as having a “compensatory side, serving 
remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives.”133  The Court  explained:
There is no question that some liability beyond the amount of the 
fraud is usually ‘necessary to compensate the government completely for 
the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims’ 
[Citations omitted].  The most obvious indication that the treble damages 
ceiling has a remedial place under this statute is its qui tam feature with its 
possibility of diverting as much as 30 percent of the Government’s 
recovery to a private relator who began the action.  In qui tam cases the 
rough difference between double and triple damages may well serve not to 
punish, but to quicken the self-interest of some private plaintiff who can 
spot violations and start litigating to compensate the Government, while 
benefiting himself as well.134
The Court further explained that even in the absence of a qui tam relator, treble damages 
may be necessary for the Government to fully recover what it lost due to the fraud.135 The 
Court supported its characterization of treble damages as remedial by noting that the Act 
has no separate provisions for prejudgment interest, nor does it provide for recovery of 
consequential damages.136
The Court’s pronouncements in Stevens and Chandler suggest that even when the 
qui tam relator receives the maximum recovery permitted under the Act, because the 
131
 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
132 Id. at 132-133.
133 Id. at 130.
134 Id. at 130-131.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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relator is not personally injured by the wrongdoer’s conduct, the recovery is to 
compensate for an offense to the public.  But these pronouncements also suggest that the 
entire award, including the treble damages, is designed to ensure that the United States is 
made whole, and that public rights and duties are protected and enforced.
c. Proportionality of Recovery Under the Act
In keeping with the Act’s purpose of compensating an injured Government, in 
United States v. Bornstein137 the Supreme Court characterized the Act’s then-double 
damages and money penalties of $2,000 per claim as remedial rather than punitive.138
Nevertheless, when the statute was amended in 1986 to authorize treble damages139 and 
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per claim,140 Congress stated that the enhanced remedy 
remained remedial, although intended to make the Government whole through a form of 
“rough justice,” rather than precisely compensate the Government for its losses.141  When 
amending the Act in 1986, Congress believed that “[E]ven in the cases where there is no 
dollar loss—for example where a defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality 
yet there are no apparent defects—the integrity of quality requirements in procurement 
137
 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976).
138 But see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139
 The Act allows this to be reduced to double damages when the defendant has voluntarily disclosed to the 
Government information regarding the false claim.  See 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(7) (2000).
140
 31 U.S.C. §3729 (2000).
141 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).  Most courts do not interpret the Act to allow for an 
award of consequential damages or prejudgment interest.  See, e.g., Cook County v. United States ex rel. 
Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 131 (2003); United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1973); 
contra United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 79 F. Supp.2d 877 (S. D. Ohio 1999) (awarding 
replacement costs of a defective helicopter to the government).  Thus, one could argue that the treble 
damages awarded under the Act substitute for the prejudgment interest and consequential damages that 
would normally be available to a successful plaintiff in a fraud case.  Likewise, although a qui tam relator’s 
attorneys’ fees and costs are separately reimbursable under the Act, see 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(2) (2000), the 
government’s investigative costs and expenses are not separately reimbursable.  Chandler, 538 U.S. at 131.  
The treble damages and penalties take the place of these items. Id.
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programs is seriously undermined.”142  Under the Act, money penalties are usually
imposed,143 even when the Government has suffered little or no loss from the defendant’s 
false claims.144 Because penalties can be imposed even in the absence of any actual 
damages, many courts acknowledge that at least the money penalties under the Act are 
punitive in nature, and that they are clearly disproportionate to the damage done.145  The 
courts’ discomfort with the imposition of large fines that are disproportionate to actual 
harm done has led to some creative approaches to counting false claims for purposes of 
imposing damages and penalties.
United States v. Krizek146 is a good example of the courts’ creative approach to 
alleviating the discomfort they experience when applying what they consider to be the 
disproportionate remedies of the Act.  In Krizek, an elderly psychiatrist and his wife, who 
was his office manager, were found liable under the Act for submitting false claims to the 
Government for Medicare and Medicaid payments over a period of six years.147  Because 
of the difficulty of determining which claims were false, the district court determined that 
on a day where Dr. Krizek submitted claims for time spent with patients in excess of nine 
142
 S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268; see also United States v. 
Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1018 [hereinafter, Mackby II] (discussing fraud against the Government as not 
only harming the Government monetarily, but harming the administration and integrity of a Government 
program).
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 Many courts have held that money penalties are mandatory upon a finding of liability.  See, e.g., United 
States v. McLeod, 721 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Fahner v. Alaska, 591 F. Supp. 
794 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (imposing penalties for 551 false claims, although actual damages were less than 
$20,000); Mackby II, 339 F.3d 1013 (imposing penalties of $555,000 when actual damages were 
$58,151.64); contra Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1975) (limiting penalties awarded to 
prevent implication of the Excessive Fines clause and keep proportionality); United States ex rel. Garibaldi
v. Orleans Parish School Board, 46 F. Supp.2d 546, 565 (E.D. La. 1999) (court reduced penalty awarded by 
the jury from $7,850,000 to $100,000, based on prior case law holding that the court has discretion to 
assure that penalties are not excessive and disproportionate), vacated on other grounds, 244 F.3d 486, 491-
93 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002), reh’g denied, 534 U.S. 1172 (2002).
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 S. Rep. 99-345 at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273;  see also Hagood v. Sonoma
County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991); Rex Trailor Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 
148, 153 n.5 (1956).
145 United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter, Mackby I].
146
 192 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
147 Id. at 1025.
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hours, all claims submitted in excess of the nine-hour benchmark would be considered 
false, and penalties under the Act would be assessed for each such claim.148
Nevertheless, because the claims sent to the Government indicated only the type of 
service performed, not the precise length of the service, the Special Master appointed by 
the district court to calculate Dr. Krizek’s liability assumed that each service took the 
minimum amount of time, and calculated the excess number of claims on that basis.149
Using this methodology, “the Special Master identified 264 days on which the Krizeks 
billed for more than nine hours, amounting to 1,149 false claims.  Multiplying by $5,000, 
the minimum fine per claim under the False Claims Act, the Special Master calculated a 
total fine of $5.7 million.”150
The district court accepted the Special Master’s findings of fact, but apparently 
uncomfortable with the size of the fine, abandoned the nine-hour benchmark.151  Instead, 
the district court adopted a twenty-four hour benchmark, holding that the Krizeks would 
only be liable for claims submitted on days when they billed for more than twenty-four 
hours of work, and only for the services that were rendered after twenty-four hours had 
passed on a particular day.152  Using this new benchmark, the court assessed a $10,000 
maximum fine under the Act for each of eleven false claims, entering judgment against 
the Krizeks for $110,000.153
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court, instructing it 
to consider each billing form submitted by the Krizeks as a single claim, regardless of 
148 Id. at 1025-26.
149 Id. at 1026.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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how many services for a patient were recorded on the form.154  It also instructed the 
district court to allow the Government to introduce evidence refuting the Special Master’s 
use of the minimum amount of time that could be attributed to a particular service, and to 
introduce evidence that Dr. Krizek also saw private-pay patients on days when he billed 
excessively, thus potentially increasing the number of Medicare and Medicaid claims 
submitted in excess of twenty-four hours a day.155  Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit did not 
overturn the district court’s use of the twenty-four hour benchmark, which was favorable 
to the Krizeks.  The D.C. Circuit was apparently uncomfortable with the enormity of the 
original $5.7 million civil penalty imposed under the Act compared with the harm to the 
Government caused by the Krizeks.156
d. The Excessive Fines Clause
Courts recently have held that penalties and treble damages awarded under the 
Act that are disproportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s offense implicate the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.157
Only punitive forfeitures implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.158 By holding that the 
154 Id. at 1027.
155 Id.
156
 The D.C. Circuit also expressed its displeasure with the Government’s prolonged prosecution of the 
case, stating: 
“ This prosecution of a single doctor has now spanned over six years.  It has consumed three 
weeks of trial, several days of hearings before the Special Master and the district court, two fully briefed, 
fully argued appeals, and five published opinions (three by the district court and two by this court).  The 
five days on which the false claims were made occurred over twelve years ago.  According to defense 
counsel, Dr. Krizek no longer practices medicine and is dying of cancer. . . . It is time for the parties to stop 
refighting battles long-ago lost and for the district court to bring this prosecution to an expeditious close.”  
Id. at 1031.
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s desire that the litigation would end, after remand to the district court for 
recalculation of damages, the Krizeks appealed to the D.C. Circuit again, advocating a new theory of 
violation of the Excessive Fines clause (see discussion of the Mackby cases, infra., this section.), and when 
that failed, requested certiorari, which was denied.  Krizek v. United States, 534 U.S. 1067, cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
157 Mackby I, 261 F. 3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327-
28, 334 (1998). 
158
 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
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penalties and treble damages awarded under the Act implicate the Excessive Fines Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment, the courts have implicitly held that sanctions under the Act are 
punitive, without analyzing whether the Murphy (or any other) factors support such a 
characterization.159  In deeming statutory treble damages “punitive,” the courts have also 
ignored some obvious differences between true punitive damages and statutory treble 
damages.  As the Fifth Circuit has noted:  “[P]unitive damages are awarded under 
notoriously open-ended legal standards and a broadly defined constitutional limit 
concerning the amount awarded.  Treble damages, however, represent a mere 
mathematical expansion of the actual damages calculated [by the arbitrator].”160  The 
limited nature of statutory treble damages may distinguish them from open-ended 
punitive damages in application of the Excessive Fines Clause.161
Despite all of the courts’ creativity in minimizing the disproportionate impact of 
sanctions under the Act, it is difficult to find a general rule explaining when recovery 
under the Act is disproportionate to the harm suffered, such that the Act would be 
considered punitive in nature under the Murphy test.  As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in Mackby II, there is no rigid set of factors used to decide whether a fine 
is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.162  The Mackby II court looked at 
159 See United States v. Mackby (Mackby II), 339 F.3d at 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
1657 (2004).  Nevertheless, in Mackby II, the court also conceded that at least some portion of the sanctions 
under the Act are remedial, based on cases construing the pre-Amendment Act’s sanctions as remedial.  
Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1019. 
160 Investment Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2002); see also, 
Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003).
161 See, e.g., Investment Partners, id. at 318 (holding that antitrust treble damages may be “punitive” 
because they exceed actual damages inflicted on the victim of the violative conduct, but are not “punitive” 
for purposes of interpreting the scope of an arbitration clause).  In Chandler, 538 U.S. at 130, the Court 
implicitly recognized the difference between true punitive damages and the treble damages available under 
the Act by characterizing the treble damages as a “ceiling.”
162 Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1016.  Likewise, “[I]t would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a 
court to determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose 
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the presence or absence of related illegal activity, the amount of actual harm caused to the 
government and others, and the criminal penalties available under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines163 for violating similar criminal statutes to make this determination.164  The 
court also considered the relationship between the sanctions imposed by the lower court 
and the maximum possible sanctions authorized by Congress, and the Act’s scienter 
requirement.165 Based on these factors, the Mackby II court held that a judgment of 
$729,454.92 under the Act based on actual damages to the Government of $58,151.64 
was not “grossly disproportionate” and did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.166
e. Cases Where There Is No Damage
The analysis called for by the third prong of Murphy has no meaning when 
monetary penalties are imposed under the Act, but the Government has suffered no 
monetary damage. Such cases are much more like Blackstone’s description of punitive 
“crimes and misdemeanors,” than remedial actions to make an injured party whole.167
The money penalties imposed in such a case are by definition disproportionate to the 
monetary harm inflicted on the United States.  This is true even if some liability beyond 
the amount of the fraud is required to completely compensate the Government for losses 
of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment.”  
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)
163 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §2B1.1(b)(1) (2001).
164 Mackby II, 339 F.3d at 1017.
165 Id.
166 Id.  The court noted that the maximum civil penalty Mackby faced was $84,990,000.  If the Mackby II
court’s assumption that the Act’s sanctions are mainly punitive in nature is accepted, I would expect to see 
future challenges to large awards under the Act on the grounds that they violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in accordance with the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent resurrection of the concept of economic substantive due process when reviewing awards of 
punitive damages.  See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (both holding that large punitive 
damage awards under state law violate the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
167
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caused by the fraudulent claims.168 The pre-1986 version of the Act, which imposed less-
onerous penalties than those of the current Act, but had been construed to allow 
imposition of such penalties even in the absence of actual damages, was remedial.169 The 
fact that the penalties imposed are higher after the 1986 Amendments to the Act than the 
penalties imposed under earlier versions of the Act should not matter for purposes of 
proportionality when the Government has suffered no damages.  Whether the penalties 
are $2,000 per claim, as they were under older versions of the Act, or $10,000 per claim,
as they are under the current version of the Act, the ratio of penalties to damages when 
the damages are zero will still be mathematically undefined, and by their very nature, 
disproportionate to damages suffered by the Government.  
B. Using “Civil” and “Criminal” Designations as a Proxy for “Remedial” and 
“Punitive” Characterizations
Attempts to simplify the analysis of survivability under the common-law test by 
using the label of “civil” or “criminal” as a guide to the true nature of the Act are also 
unavailing.  Although one would assume that criminal statutes “punish,” while civil 
statutes “compensate” or “remediate,” the label “civil” or “criminal” placed on a statute 
by Congress does not answer the question of whether a statutory action is “penal” or 
“remedial” under the law.  Civil remedies can be transformed into criminal penalties if 
they are severe enough in purpose or effect.170 The United States Supreme Court has 
instructed that “[e]ven in those cases where the legislature ‘has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so 
168 Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003).
169 United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315 (1976).
170 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997), citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
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punitive either in purpose or effect,’171 as to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a 
civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ”172
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has also instructed that “‘[o]nly 
the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”173 Despite the courts’ direction that 
Congress’ denomination of a statute as “civil” or “criminal” should be treated with the 
utmost respect, a statute characterized by Congress as “civil,” may be considered “penal” 
for certain purposes, even if it is not characterized as “criminal.”174 The question then 
becomes whether the statute is penal for all purposes, including the survivability analysis, 
or only for selected purposes.
In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the 
Act is penal for some, but not all purposes, and its denomination as a “civil” statute is not 
helpful when distinguishing between the two. In United States v. Halper,175 the appellee 
was convicted of 65 counts of violation of the criminal False Claims Act.176 After 
Halper’s criminal conviction, the Government brought an action under the civil False 
171 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
172 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
173 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100; quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
174See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (The labels “criminal” and “civil” are not of 
paramount importance when determining whether a statutory sanction implicates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause), overruled on other grounds by Hudson, 522 U.S. 93.
175The Court first grappled with the “civil” versus “criminal” nature of the Act in applying the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the Act in United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).  In that case, actual damages to the Government were $101,500, 
and the total recovery was $315,000 ($203,000 in double damages and $112,000 in penalties).  Id. at 540.  
The total recovery to the Government, after the qui tam relators took their share, was only $150,000.  Id. at 
545.  The Court held that this amount was purely remedial, because it compensated the Government for
ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, and therefore it did not implicate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. at 551-552.   The present-day Act, which requires sanctions of treble damages 
and as much as $11,000 per-claim penalties, is far more likely to yield a recovery to the Government that is 
disproportionate to the damages and the ancillary costs incurred by the Government.
17618 U.S.C. §287 (2000).  Halper submitted 65 demands for reimbursement from the federal Medicare 
program over the course of two years at a rate of $12 per claim, when the actual service rendered entitled 
him to only $3 per claim.  49 U.S. at 436.  This resulted in an overpayment of $585.  Id.
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Claims Act based on the same transactions that formed the basis for the criminal 
conviction.177  The statutory penalty called for by the Act totaled $130,000, while the 
actual damages to the Government totaled $585.178  The district court regarded the 
$130,000 penalty to be so disproportionate to the actual damages incurred by the 
Government (more than 220 times greater than actual damages) that it characterized the 
money penalty as a “punishment” that violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, despite the 
statute’s label as “civil.”179
The United States Supreme Court agreed, stating:
Although, taken together, these cases180 establish that proceedings and 
penalties under the civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature, and 
that a civil remedy does not rise to the level of “punishment” merely 
because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the 
Government’s actual damages, they do not foreclose the possibility that in 
a particular case a civil penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme 
and so divorced from the Government’s damages and expenses as to 
constitute punishment.181
The Court stated the question to be answered in Halper as:  “[W]hether a civil 
sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes 
‘punishment’ for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.”182  The Court noted that prior 
cases were not helpful in answering the question, because they did not address situations 
where a statutory imprecise formula for damages authorizes a remedial sanction that is 
177 Halper, 49 U.S. at 438.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 439-440.
180
 The Court is referring to Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); and Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
181 Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-442.
182 Id. at 443.
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completely disproportionate to the Government’s damages and actual costs.183  Writing 
on a clean slate, the Court said:
[A] civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the 
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment . . 
. it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to 
understand the term.184
The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a defendant who has been 
criminally prosecuted and punished, and then is subjected to a civil sanction, if the 
second sanction is fairly characterized as solely deterrent or retributive.185  Nevertheless, 
the Court was careful to point out that this rule is for the “rare case” where the civil 
penalty sought in a proceeding, after a criminal penalty has been imposed, is 
“overwhelmingly” disproportionate to the damages the offender has caused.186  Although 
the Court explicitly left the determination of what constitutes an “overwhelmingly” 
disproportionate penalty to the discretion of the trial court, it specifically mentioned the 
increased civil penalties of the 1986 Amendments to the Act as an example of a civil 
sanction that would constitute a second punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.187
Halper appeared to establish that when sanctions imposed under the Act were 
“overwhelmingly” disproportionate to the Government’s damages, the Act was punitive.
In so doing, the Court elevated the deterrent and retributive purposes of the Act over the 
remedial purposes of the Act, even when the Act allowed recovery of only double 
damages and smaller money penalties than are permitted under today’s Act.
183 Id. at 446.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 448-449 (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 449.
187 Id. at 450 n.9.  The Court also explicitly stated that the question of whether a qui tam action brought 
under the Act would implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause remained unresolved.  Id. at 451 n.11.
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Eight years later, in Hudson v. United States,188 the appellants, relying on Halper,
challenged a criminal prosecution initiated by the United States after the federal Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency imposed monetary penalties and administrative 
debarment on them for violation of a federal banking statute under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.189  The criminal prosecution was based on the same transactions that were the 
basis for the prior administrative actions.190 The Court, citing “concerns about the wide 
variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper,”191 breathed life
back into the labels “criminal” and “civil” by emphasizing that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the 
same offense.”192 The Court reiterated that in the first instance, one must look to 
Congress’ express or implied label of “civil” or “criminal” for the statute, and that a 
statute that had been labeled “civil” by Congress could only be transformed into a 
criminal penalty if its punitive purpose or effect is “overwhelming.”193  The Court 
described the following “useful guideposts” for determining whether a statutory scheme 
is punitive in either purpose or effect so as to transform a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty:
‘(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint’; 
(2) ‘whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment’; (3) 
‘whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter’; (4) ‘whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and 
deterrence’; (5) ‘whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime’; (6) ‘whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
188
 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
189 Id. at 95-98, see also, Stephanie L. Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers:  
How the Civil False Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its Damages
and Penalties Provision, 71 Geo Wash. L. Rev. 159, 167-168 (2003).
190 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97-98.
191 Id. at 98.  For a summary of cases asserting that various civil penalties constituted “punishment” under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause in the wake of Halper, see 1 BOESE, supra note 4, §3.06[A] at n.293.
192
 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added).
193 Id., quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980).
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connected is assignable for it’; and (7) ‘Whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’194
The Court criticized its decision in Halper as having bypassed the threshold question of 
whether the successive punishment was “criminal,” and because it focused on the 
disproportionality of the sanction to the damage without considering the other 
guideposts.195  The Court also retreated from its focus on the character of the sanctions 
imposed in Halper, and emphasized the importance of relying on Congress’ 
characterization of a statute as “civil.”196  According to the Court, the protections of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause are unnecessary in cases of civil fines, because the Eighth 
Amendment Excessive Fines protections apply to such cases.197  Furthermore, the Court 
acknowledged that attempting to distinguish between “punitive” and “nonpunitive” 
penalties was inordinately confusing, and that the confusion outweighed the benefit of the 
additional protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.198
Hudson establishes that civil penalties are not subject to analysis under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and that such an analysis is reserved for criminal penalties.  But 
Halper and Hudson also establish that a “civil” action can be “punitive” even if it is not 
“criminal,” without specifically deciding whether a cause of action brought under the 
current version of the Act was such an action, and if so, under what circumstances.  
194 Id. at 99-100, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 
195 Id. at 100.
196 Id. at 101.  The Court observed that focusing on the sanction actually imposed requires that a defendant 
proceed through trial to judgment before the court can determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has 
been violated, which is antithetical to the Clause’s prohibition against even attempting a second criminal 
punishment.  Id. at 102.
197 Id.
198 Id.  In Hudson, the Court applied the test articulated in United States v Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 
(1980), to the money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed on Hudson for violating the federal 
banking statutes.  The Court held that it was apparent that Congress intended the sanctions to be civil in 
nature, and that there was no clear proof that the sanctions were so punitive in form or effect that they were 
rendered criminal.  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103-104.
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Therefore, we must look beyond the label of “civil” or “criminal” to determine whether a
cause of action is punitive or remedial, and whether it survives the death of a party. In 
the case of the Act, the civil label Congress has placed on the statute is particularly 
unhelpful to this analysis, because the United States Supreme Court has described the 
treble damages authorized under the Act as both “punitive in nature,”199 and as having a 
“remedial place.”200
V. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE ACT
A. Public Disclosure and “Original Source”
The historical common-law tests of survivability also do not account for
challenges created by a unique provision in the Act limiting the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain qui tam cases. The 1943 version of the Act contained a revised
jurisdictional bar designed to prevent the filing of “parasitic” lawsuits such as United 
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,201 where the relator merely copied the Government’s pre-
existing pleadings and filed a qui tam suit. This provision stated that no court would 
have jurisdiction over a qui tam suit if the government had prior knowledge of the 
allegations in the complaint.202 In 1986, under the impression that as much as ten percent 
of the entire federal budget was being lost to fraud,203 Congress amended the 
jurisdictional bar to make it possible for qui tam relators to bring private suits based on 
information that was already in the public domain, but which the relator had brought to 
the public domain as the “original source:”
199 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784-85 (2000)
200 Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003).
201
 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
202
 31 U.S.C. §233(c) (1976) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §3730(e) (2000)).  This provision was a 
compromise between legislators who wanted to repeal the qui tam provisions of the Act entirely, and 
legislators who did not want to amend the qui tam provisions at all.  See Boese, supra note 4 at §1.02.
203
 S. Rep. 99-345 at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267-68.
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No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section 
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a 
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of 
the information.
For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an 
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information 
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the 
information to the Government before filing an action under this section 
which is based on the information.204
Although the meaning of this section, commonly known as the “public 
disclosure” bar, has been the subject of extensive litigation,205 it is clear that a court has 
no subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam case brought under the Act if the case is 
based on a public disclosure, and the relator is not an original source of the information 
on which the allegations are based.206  In a case where the qui tam relator acknowledges
that the suit is based on publicly disclosed information, or where the defendant 
establishes that there has been a public disclosure of such information despite the 
relator’s insistence to the contrary, the court must decide whether the relator is an 
“original source” of the information in order to establish that it has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case prior to proceeding to the merits.207 The federal courts cannot 
204
 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4) (2000).  In the legislative history to the 1986 Amendment to the Act, Congress 
expressed its dismay that the absolute jurisdictional bar of the then-current version of the Act had been 
interpreted by the courts to prevent a qui tam relator from pursuing a case even if the Government took no 
action after the putative relator informed the Government the allegations of fraud.  S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 
12-13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277-78.
205 See 1 BOESE, supra note 4, §4.02.  Litigation about the meaning and effect of the public disclosure 
provision has centered on whether the list of methods of public disclosure contained in the statute is 
exclusive, when a qui tam suit is “based upon” a public disclosure, and what is an “original source” for 
purposes of the provision.  Id.
206
 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4) (2000).
207Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (“The requirement that 
jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of 
the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’”), quoting Mansfield C & L. M.R. Co. v. 
Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).    
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hypothesize subject matter jurisdiction in order to decide the merits of a case.208 The qui 
tam relator has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his suit is 
not based upon a public disclosure, or, if it is, that he was an original source of the 
information.209
To be an “original source,” the relator must have “direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based.”210  “Direct 
knowledge” is firsthand knowledge, gained without any intervening agency or outside 
influence.211  “Independent knowledge” is defined as knowledge independent of any 
public disclosure.212  When a qui tam relator files a suit under the Act, the relator is 
required to prepare and serve on the Government “a written disclosure of substantially all 
material evidence and information” the relator possesses.213  In addition to educating the 
Government about the case so that the Government can decide whether or not to 
intervene, the disclosure statement also assists the court in determining whether the 
relator has the “direct and independent knowledge” necessary to maintain a suit where 
information has been publicly disclosed.214
B. Discovery Issues
208 Id.  
209 United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng., Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999); United States ex. rel. 
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1998), FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
210
 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
211 United States ex rel. Kinney v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Stone v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co.
v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins., 944 F.2d 1149, 
1160 (3d Cir. 1991).
212 Minnesota Nurses Ass’n v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002); United States
ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 2000).
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 1 BOESE, supra note 4, §4.04[A]; see also, United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 
320 (2d Cir. 1992) (Government moved to dismiss case under public disclosure bar while complaint was 
under seal); United States ex rel. Alcohol Found., Inc. v. Kalmanovitz Charitable Found., Inc., 186 F. 
Supp. 2d 458, 459-460 (S.D.N.Y.) (Government suggested to court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
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The law is unsettled as to whether a defendant can discover the relator’s 
disclosure statement to the Government.  In one line of cases, the courts have held that no 
privilege attaches to the disclosure statement and supplementary materials, and have 
permitted discovery.215  Other courts have held that the disclosure statement is subject to 
the attorney work product privilege,216 the joint prosecution privilege,217 or the law 
enforcement privilege.218  Still other courts have permitted discovery of some parts of the 
disclosure statement, but not others.219
Even if the disclosure statement is discoverable, defendants are likely to zealously 
advocate that it is no substitute for the ability to cross-examine the relator regarding the 
source of his knowledge of publicly disclosed information. Obviously, the most relevant 
and fruitful source for discovery on issues of the relator’s direct and independent 
knowledge of information forming the allegations of the complaint is the relator.  The 
relator’s deposition is virtually irreplaceable to defendants attempting to refute a relator’s
allegations that the relator is an “original source” in cases where there has been a public 
disclosure.220
215 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. Roe Co., 904 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Ky. 1995); United 
States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell International Corp., 144 F.R.D. 396 (D. Colo. 1992).  
216 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
217 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp.,167 F.R.D. 680 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
218 See, e.g., In re Subpoena to the United States Attorney’s Office, No. M 8-85-BSJ, 2000 WL 45726 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2000).
219 See, e.g., Grand ex rel. United States v. Northrop Corp., 811 F. Supp. 333, 337 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (court 
conducts in camera inspection of relator’s disclosure materials and determines that the relator’s analysis be 
redacted prior to discovery by defendant).
220The arguments of the parties made in United States ex rel. Harrington v. Sisters of Providence 
in Oregon, 209 F. Supp.2d 1085 (D. Or. 2002), provide an example of the importance of the availability of 
the relator to the subject matter jurisdiction determination and to the defendant.  In Harrington, the 
defendants moved to dismiss the qui tam complaint after the relator’s death, arguing (among other things) 
that there was a likelihood that the information on which the relator’s allegations were based had been 
publicly disclosed, and that the death of the relator severely prejudiced the defendant and precluded the 
court from inquiring into its subject matter jurisdiction, thereby warranting dismissal.  Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 12(b)(1) at 8-10, Harrington (No. CV 98-1487 JO).  The relator’s estate’s representative argued in 
response that the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction was on the relator, and therefore the 
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When the relator dies before the defendant has taken the relator’s deposition, even 
if the court believes that the disclosure statement and the material evidence contained 
therein are sufficient for the court to determine that it does have jurisdiction, the 
defendant will argue that it is severely prejudiced due to its inability to cross-examine the 
relator regarding public disclosure and original source allegations. A court may order 
dismissal as a remedy to prevent unfairness to a defendant due to an inability to obtain 
discovery from a plaintiff.221 Nevertheless, the death of a plaintiff prior to discovery of 
the plaintiff does not automatically mandate dismissal of the claim.222  A court will 
balance the prejudice to the defendant caused by the death of the plaintiff against the 
right of the plaintiff’s successors to pursue the suit.223 There are no reported cases in 
which the court has engaged in such a balancing test with regard to prejudice to a 
defendant’s ability to assert the Act’s jurisdictional bar caused by a qui tam relator’s 
death.  Nevertheless, at least one case has suggested that if a plaintiff is an original and 
direct source of information which formed the basis for a statement that was the subject 
of a defamation action, and the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine 
defendant was not prejudiced.  Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First 
Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) at 13, Harrington (No. CV 98-1587-JO); see
also, 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶12.30[5] (3d ed. 2004).  The relator’s 
estate’s representative also reminded the court that the defendant had opposed a prior attempt by relator’s 
counsel to perpetuate the relator’s testimony. Id.  The defendants replied that regardless of whom has the 
ultimate burden of proof on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the death of the relator severely 
prejudiced the defendants’ ability to defend against the case, because it prejudiced the defendants’ ability to 
even bring a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, much less meet the 
burden of proof on the motion.  Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) at 7-9, Harrington (No. 
CV-98-1587 JO).
221 Wehling v. C.B.S., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979); MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 
1053, 1058 (D.N.J. 1983).
222 MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1059.
223 Id. at 1060.
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the plaintiff regarding the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement, dismissal may be 
required to alleviate the prejudice to the defendant.224
One commentator has suggested that prejudice to the defendant can be alleviated 
in a case where a “private” plaintiff in a defamation action dies by shifting the burden of 
proving that the statement is true from the defendant to the plaintiff, or by shifting the 
burden of proving certain defenses from the defendant to the plaintiff.225 Although this 
might relieve a defendant of an ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, such burden-
shifting does not alleviate prejudice to a defendant caused by an inability to bring a 
defensive motion to dismiss due to the defendant’s inability to meet the burdens of 
production or proof on the motion because of the relator’s death. Nor does it relieve the 
defendant of the prejudice caused by an inability to effectively challenge the relator’s 
ability to meet the burden of proof on the issue, even if the initial burden is shifted to the 
plaintiff.  In a case brought under the Act, the determination of the relator’s original 
source status is even more crucial than the ability to determine the truth of information 
from its source in a defamation case.  Under the Act, the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction depends on the relator’s original source status, and the court cannot even 
consider the merits of the case without making this threshold determination.  Neither the 
Murphy test nor any other historical test for survivability takes into account the 
challenges raised by the Act’s jurisdictional bar in a case where the qui tam relator dies.
VI. A POLICY-BASED PROPOSAL FOR SURVIVABILITY
224 Id.  In MacDonald, the court contrasted the situation at hand, where the defendant was not claiming that 
the plaintiff was the original and direct source of the information on which the allegedly defamatory 
statement was based, with a hypothetical situation in which a plaintiff was such an original and direct 
source.  Id. at 1059.  Because in the case at hand, the plaintiff was not alleged to be the original and direct 
source of the information, the court held that the prejudice to the defendants caused by the plaintiff’s death 
was not “substantial,” and refused to dismiss the case.  Id. at 1060. 
225
 Florence Frances Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the Antiquated “Actio 
Personails” Doctrine, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1848-49 (1985).
43
A. The Importance of Congressional Intent
In light of the difficulty of applying the historical test in determining whether a 
qui tam relator’s cause of action under the Act survives the relator’s death, and the 
unhelpfulness of Congress’ characterization of a statute as “civil” or “criminal,” “penal” 
or “remedial” to make that determination, the courts must look to some other criteria to 
determine whether a qui tam relator’s cause of action is survivable. Rather than trying to 
stuff all federal statutory causes of action into the ancient “penal” or “remedial” 
categories, in cases involving federal statutes that create rights that were unknown at 
common law, codify rights that previously existed at common law, or significantly 
modify rights that were codified centuries ago, if there is no explicit statutory provision 
addressing survivability, the primary consideration should be whether survival of a cause 
of action under the statute furthers the purpose of the statute as expressed by Congress. 226
The United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of congressional 
intent when determining whether a federal statutory cause of action survives the death of 
one of the parties in Cox v. Roth.227  In Cox, the Court was faced with the question of 
whether an action brought under the Jones Act228 survives the death of the defendant 
tortfeasor. The Cox Court acknowledged that at common law, actions for personal injury 
abated upon the death of one of the parties, but characterized the rule as one of “extreme 
harshness.”229 To alleviate the harshness of the common law rule, the Court looked to the 
policy behind the Jones Act, which it understood to be to fully provide for compensation 
226 Mallick v. IBEW, 814 F.2d 674, 678-679 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
227
 348 U.S. 207, 208 (1955).
228
 46 U.S.C. §688 (2000).  The Jones Act provides a cause of action for seamen injured at sea against the 
owners of seagoing vessels.
229 Cox, 348 U.S. at 209.
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of injured seamen or their families regardless of the nature or identity of the tortfeasor.230
To explain its decision to abandon the common law rule regarding survivability, the 
Court said: 
The policy as well as the letter of the law is a guide to decision.  Resort to 
the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to 
qualify its apparent absolutes. . . The process of interpretation also misses 
its high function if a strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or 
deletion of a provision which a less literal leading would preserve.231
The Cox Court also noted that abandoning the common-law rule of survivability 
of tort actions was in accordance with the trend among the states:
[W]e do note that advancing civilization and social progress have brought 
43 of our States to include in their general law the principle of the survival 
of causes of action against deceased tortfeasors, and that such recovery, 
rather than being exceptional, has now become the rule in almost every 
common-law jurisdiction.232
The courts’ willingness to elevate the policy of the law and Congress’ intent over 
historical characterization need not be limited to statutes that codify common-law causes 
of action, but may also be applied to statutes that create new federal causes of action, 
unknown at common law, or significantly modify ancient causes of action. As the United 
States Supreme Court said over 100 years ago; “[w]hether an action survives or abates 
upon the death of a party depends on the substance of the action, not the forms of 
proceedings to enforce the action.”233 Just as the historical “personal” versus “property” 
nature of a tort need not be dispositive of the survivability of a tort action, the terms 
“penal” or “remedial” need not be dispositive of the nature of federal statutory action.  
Such terms are merely shorthand for the relevant considerations as to whether a cause of 
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76 , 80 (1884).
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action should survive the death of a party.234 The question of survivability of a federal 
statutory claim is essentially a question of statutory interpretation.235
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized 
the need to abandon the historical distinctions of “penal” versus “remedial” when it 
comes to determining the survivability of federal statutes that create new rights, or 
significantly change rights that existed at common law.  For example, in Mallick v. 
IBEW236 a member of a labor union sought disclosure of the union’s financial records 
under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”).237
While an appeal of the trial court’s decision in favor of the plaintiff was pending, the 
plaintiff died.238  The union argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action abated upon his 
death, relying on the common law distinction between suits based on personal torts and 
suits based on property or contract rights.239  The D.C. Circuit flatly stated that “these 
cases no longer control adjudication of survivorship issues associated with federal 
claims,” noting the “difficulty of forcing many newer statutory rights into its somewhat 
archaic and rigid distinction between personal and property claims.”240
Rather than trying to determine whether a cause of action for disclosure of 
financial information under the LMRDA was based on “personal” or “property” rights, or 
was “penal” or “remedial,” the Mallick Court focused on the legislative history of the 
LMRDA, which indicated that a major goal of the LMRDA was deterrence of financial 
234 Riggs v. Government Employees Financial Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1980).
235 Mallick v. IBEW, 814 F.2d 674, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1987), citing Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1955).
236 Id.
237
 29 U.S.C. §431 (2000).
238 Mallick, 814 F.2d at 675.
239 Id. at 676, 678.
240 Id. at 678.
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abuses by unions.241  The Mallick Court held that the plaintiff’s cause of action for 
disclosure of information under the LMRDA survived the plaintiff’s death, because the 
statute’s goal of deterrence of financial wrongdoing by unions would be best served by 
allowing an action for disclosure under the LMRDA to survive the death of a particular 
union member.242
Twelve years later, in Sinito v. United States Department of Justice,243 the D.C. 
Circuit held that a cause of action seeking the release of information held by the 
Government under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)244 could survive the death 
of a plaintiff.  In Sinito, the defendant argued that under the historical common-law test, 
FOIA was not a remedial statute, and therefore did not survive the death of the plaintiff 
requesting information.245  Although the trial court agreed, and dismissed the case, the 
D.C. Circuit, following its precedent in Mallick, disregarded the common-law rule.  
Instead, it looked to whether allowing the action to survive the death of the plaintiff 
would further Congress’ goals in enacting FOIA.246 The Sinito Court reviewed the 
legislative history of FOIA, and held that allowing a case brought under FOIA to survive 
the death of the plaintiff would foster one of the “paramount goals” of FOIA, the goal of 
deterring secrecy in government and government corruption.247
The Sinito defendants tried to distinguish Mallick by arguing that FOIA creates a 
right of access available to all citizens, as opposed to the defined class who are permitted 
to exercise the right of access under the LMRDA, and thus, creates a right that was 
241 Id. at 677.
242 Id.
243
 176 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  Judge Wald authored both the Mallick and the Sinito opinions.
244
 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000).
245 Sinito, 176 F.3d at 513.
246 Id. at 513-514.
247 Id. at 514.
47
somehow less “personal” than the right held to survive the death of the plaintiff in 
Mallick.248 The Sinito Court was unimpressed by this argument, and in holding that a 
claim for disclosure under FOIA can survive the death of the plaintiff, noted:
Moreover, we are dealing here not with a vast pool of potential FOIA 
applicants, any of whom might seek to take Thomas Sinito’s place in the 
litigation.  An original requestor who goes to court to compel disclosure 
by the agency has a stake in the legal action which transcends that of “any 
person” who might seek the FOIA document.  He has invested time, and 
in all likelihood money, in the action . . . . The fact that other citizens 
could have brought a similar action originally in no way vitiates that 
conclusion.249
The logic of Sinito applies equally to qui tam causes of action brought under the 
Act.  As in Sinito, a qui tam cause of action cannot be brought by any member of the 
public.  A cause of action under the Act sounds in fraud. 250  Therefore, it must be plead 
with particularity.251  This operates to ensure that only persons with real knowledge of 
actual fraud can bring such cases, as opposed to members of the public at large engaging 
in  “fishing expeditions.”252  Furthermore, the jurisdictional bar prevents members of the 
public from engaging in copycat filings, further ensuring that a stranger to the alleged 
fraud.253
B. The Advantages of Using Congressional Intent to Determine Survivability
Applying the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Mallick and Sinito to qui tam cases 
brought under the Act preserves the proper role of Congress in creating a cause of action, 
and the proper role of the courts in interpreting its scope in accordance with Congress’ 
248 Id. at 514-515.
249 Id. at 515.
250
 2 BOESE, supra note 4, §5.04 at n.162.
251 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
252 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Management Group, 193 F.3d 304, 309 (5th
Cir. 1999).
253
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will. 254   It also allows the courts to avoid trying to determine whether recovery runs to a 
“harmed individual,” as required under the Murphy test, by parsing the complex and 
contradictory relationship between the qui tam relator and the Government.  The court is 
also saved from having to choose between the punitive aspects of the Act and the 
remedial aspects of the Act, and elevate one over the other, to reach a just result. 
The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments to the Act makes it clear that 
Congress intended the current version of the Act to be a mechanism to compensate the 
Government for dollars lost to fraud, and to deter potential violators from embarking on a 
course of defrauding the Government. 255  The Senate Report accompanying the 1986 
Amendments states:
Even in the cases where there is no dollar loss—for example where a 
defense contractor certifies an untested part for quality yet there are no 
apparent defects—the integrity of quality requirements in procurement 
programs is seriously undermined.256
The qui tam provisions of the original 1863 Act were:
passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization, 
that one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing 
frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions 
by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of 
personal ill will or the hope of gain.257
In the 1986 Amendments, Congress sought to increase the deterrent effect of the Act not 
only by substantially increasing the amount of money that can be assessed against a 
254 Mallick v. IBEW, 814 F.2d 674, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“When an Act of Congress has created the action 
at issue, the role of the courts in deciding the survivorship issue is to effectuate the will of Congress as best 
they can.”).
255
 S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272-5272.
256 Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268.
257 Id. at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5276 (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. 
Or. 1885).
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defendant found liable, but by easing the restrictions on who can be a qui tam relator to 
encourage fraud-fighting by private citizenry.258
C. Applying the Test of Congressional Intent to the Act
The purposes of the Act are advanced by permitting a qui tam relator’s cause of 
action under the Act to survive the death of the relator.  Furthermore, the Act’s 
jurisdictional bar assures that no person other than the relator’s legal representative can 
continue the suit, because once the qui tam case is filed, the information underlying the 
allegations are publicly disclosed under the Act.259  Such a suit can only be pursued by 
the original source of the information, and no outsider would qualify.260  If the relator’s 
legal representative cannot pursue the case, no other private citizen will be able to do so, 
and Congress’ intent to enlist and encourage private persons to assist the Government in 
fighting fraud will be frustrated.261
Although allowing a qui tam action under the Act to survive the death of the 
relator furthers the will of Congress, it does present the problem of potential prejudice to 
defendants.  Nevertheless, potential prejudice to defendants can be alleviated by applying 
ordinary principles of federal civil procedure to each case on a case-by- case basis.  In 
cases where either the defendant or the relator has presented evidence that information on 
which the allegations of the complaint are based was publicly disclosed, as defined by the 
Act, and the relator dies, the court should decide whether the parties have had sufficient 
258 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.
259
 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4) (2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 25.  The term “civil hearing” in the statute has been 
construed broadly, such that even the filing of a complaint, without further proceedings, constitutes a 
“public disclosure.”  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickenson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 
(4th Cir. 1994).
260
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261
 The Government could request permission from the court to intervene upon the relator’s death.  31 
U.S.C. §3730(c)(3) (2000).   Nevertheless, given the limited resources of the Government, it is unlikely that 
the Government will seek to later intervene in a case that it declined to prosecute initially simply because 
the relator has died. See note 12, supra.
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opportunity to develop the evidence regarding whether the relator was an “original 
source” of the information.262  If the relator’s legal representative cannot establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the relator was an “original source,” the court must 
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.263  If the court determines that 
prejudice to the defendant caused by the relator’s death is so great that to allow the suit to 
continue would be fundamentally unfair, the court can dismiss the case on those grounds, 
without finding that the relator’s cause of action abates upon his death.264
The survival of an action imposing treble damages and money penalties against a 
defendant, almost one-third of which may go to the estate of a relator who suffered no 
injury, is troubling under the common law test for survivability of a federal statutory 
action.  Nevertheless, it is not particularly troubling under a public-policy- based test.  
Congress’ stated purpose in increasing potential damages and penalties and making 
private enforcement easier and more attractive was to pique the interest of private persons 
in assisting the Government in fighting fraud. 265   The interest of an ill or elderly person,
who wishes to leave her estate to her legal representatives or successors, in assisting the 
Government in fighting fraud, is likely to be as strong as the interest of a healthy or 
young person in self-enrichment. Private antitrust cases brought under federal statutes 
that authorize an award of treble damages have been held to survive a private plaintiff’s 
262
 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4) (2000).  The issue of “original source” only arises if there is “publicly disclosed” 
information within the meaning of the statute.  United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 
699, 702 (8th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991); 
contra United States v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Colo. 1990).  Therefore, this problem 
will only arise in a small subset of cases.
263
 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4) (2000).
264 See MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D.N.J. 1983).  The court in such a case may 
want to consider whether the defendant diligently pursued discovery of the relator on the issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction prior to the relator’s death, or whether the defendant opposed a perpetuation deposition 
of the relator.
265 See Cook County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 358 U.S. 119, 131 (2003).
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death, based on Congress’ intent to encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws 
through the treble damage remedy.266 Unlike a qui tam relator, who has no personal 
injury of his own, a private plaintiff can only sue under the antitrust law if the plaintiff’s 
business or property has been injured.267 Nevertheless, the qui tam relator’s status as a 
“partial assignee” of the injured Government provides the relator status at least equivalent 
to that of a person injured by an antitrust violation for purposes of survivability and 
public policy.  Even in cases where the Government has suffered no damages, the money
penalties available under the Act may serve to compensate the Government for non-
recoverable consequential damages, and this consequential injury may be part of the 
Government’s “partial assignment” to the relator.268 Furthermore, the recent trend 
towards applying the Excessive Fines Clause to recoveries under the Act,269 and the 
reemergence of economic substantive due process in the context of punitive damage 
awards, 270 make it likely that there are sufficient checks on the court’s ability to award 
damages that are completely disproportionate to any harm suffered by the Government, 
regardless of the survivability of the relator’s action.271
VI. CONCLUSION
266 See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Survival of Right of Action for Damages Based on Violation of 
Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 A.L.R. FED. 963 n.14 (1972).  Nevertheless, there is no agreement among the 
courts as to whether treble damages survive the death of a private antitrust plaintiff, or if the legal 
representative of the plaintiff is limited to pursuing actual damages.  Id.
267
 15 U.S.C. §15 (2004).
268 See 1 BOESE, supra note 4, §3.03[A][3].
269 See Section III(A)(2)(d) supra.
270 See note 166, supra.
271
 It is also possible that a court could take the United States Supreme Court’s characterization of treble 
damages as a “ceiling,” and impose less than treble damages in a case where the relator has died.  Cook 
County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler,  358 U.S.119, 130 (2003); see also Rogers v. Douglas
Tobacco Board of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957) (in a private antitrust enforcement action, court 
allowed the claim to survive, but limited recovery to actual damages after the defendant’s death); Stephanie 
Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers:  How the Civil False Claims Act Has a 
Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its Damages and Penalties Provision, 71 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 159, 174 (proposing a two-tiered damage and penalty structure for the Act to alleviate its punitive 
effect).
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Just as the pirate leaves a map for his successor to find the hidden treasures the 
pirate accumulated in life, a qui tam relator’s complaint and disclosure statement are the 
map left for successors or legal representatives to uncover fraud against the Government, 
and reap the rewards of the relator’s discovery.  The Act is a powerful tool that Congress 
has created to protect the public fisc, deter fraud, and assist the Government in 
uncovering fraud that has already occurred.  None of these purposes are served by 
abatement of relator’s action upon death, and they are furthered by permitting a relator’s 
action to survive death and continue to be pursued by the relator’s legal representatives.
The statute’s jurisdictional bar, the inherent power of the courts to dismiss a case when 
the defendant is excessively prejudiced by inability to defend against it, and the 
constitutional protections against disproportionate remedies provide sufficient protections 
for defendants who might be severely prejudiced by the death of the relator.
As more and more qui tam cases are brought,272 and they allege more and more 
complicated fraudulent schemes, they take more and more time to work their way 
through the Government’s investigative process and our overcrowded courts. the 
likelihood of a relator dying before the case comes to its conclusion continues to increase.   
A qui tam relator’s case under the Act has been described as “the gift that keeps on 
giving.”273  The will of Congress, and protection of the public, is best served when the 
gift of a relator’s claim under the Act can be given posthumously to the relator’s legal 
representatives.
272 See 2 BOESE, supra note 4, Appendix H-1, for a chart showing the steady increase in qui tam filings 
under the Act.
273 Pursuit of False Claims, supra note 10.
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